Ten recommendations to boost the EU’s international presence

ENGAGE, a three-and-a-half year international research project led by Esade, drew to a close in June. The end of the project coincided with the European Parliament elections, which mark a time of change and opportunity for the European Union.  

The EU’s newly appointed leaders will face a daunting task: to make the EU fit for geopolitical purpose amid an unprecedented combination of external threats. In this context, ENGAGE and its team of 58 researchers examined how the EU can strengthen its international presence. 

The resulting white paper, co-authored by Monika Sus (Hertie School), Cornelius Adebahr (Carnegie Europe Foundation), and the EsadeGeo director Angel Saz-Carranza, contains 10 summarized proposals to help the EU meet key strategic international challenges. 

1. Leverage the unique position of the HR/VP 

EU foreign policy involves many stakeholders with differing priorities. The role of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) is essential in ensuring coherence. However, interinstitutional rivalries and a lack of alignment between Member States have prevented effective prioritization of external goals. Defining the scope of the HR/VP’s role is essential. The person in this role should be provided with the resources needed to steer EU foreign policy in practice. At an executive level, the HR/VP should be tasked with overseeing all European commissioners with external portfolios. The new commissioner for defense, in particular, should report to the HR/VP.  

2. Make majority-based decisions within current treaty provisions 

Any Member State can veto EU foreign policy proposals, which are decided through unanimity. But qualified majority voting (QMV) can prevent protracted negotiations — and it can be applied pragmatically (without involving treaty changes) through three existing measures: 

• Use the passerelle (or bridge) clause to enable a move towards majority voting rather than unanimity in specific policy areas - but with an emergency brake built in that Member States can activate for sensitive issues. 
• Allow Member States to use constructive abstentions from voting without blocking actions. 
• Utilize competition and trade competencies to pursue broader Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) objectives. 

3. Make better use of Special Representatives

EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) can provide analysis, deliver political messages, and communicate the EU’s engagement to third parties. The representatives have a unique level of specialist insight into their domain, and they operate under broad, discrete and flexible mandates, differentiating them from high-ranking officials.  

To improve the alignment of these flexible mandates with the EU’s priorities, the lines of coordination with the EU bureaucracy should be strengthened and clarified. EUSRs should be more accountable to the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and the European External Action Services (EEAS). They should also coordinate better with EU Delegations, and hold regular consultations with European Parliament committees. 

The number of EUSRs should furthermore be dictated by policy priorities, with mandates embedded in regional strategies and obsolete roles removed.  

4. Improve cross-institution strategic foresight

In 2010, the EU formed the interinstitutional European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) to coordinate foresight activities. It took a series of crises, however, from COVID-19 to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, for foresight methods to become professionalized and institutionalized. The flipside to this was that many individual institutions and departments began using foresight on their own, which has led to a risk of inflation and fragmentation.  

What is needed now is a strategic approach, where scenario planning and horizon scanning are integrated into the plans and actions of the whole EU. Existing structures should be identified and utilized for a coordinated, multidisciplinary approach to foresight. 

5. Harness unique competencies in security and defense

The European defense industry is fragmented, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine highlighted one of the EU’s comparative advantages: legislative and financial mechanisms. Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, for example, the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-budget financial instrument, was transformed into a powerful response to war. However, further steps are needed to reach the goal of a 40 per cent share of joint procurement by 2030 and deliver capable European armed forces in the long term: 

• Define the purpose and priorities of enhanced defense industry cooperation, in light of the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) goals. 
• Increase the EU’s defense budget to provide incentives for Member States to engage in cooperative projects. 
• Increase budgets — both the 2028-2034 multinannual budget and the 2024-2027 annual ones — to meet these needs, which will require close stakeholder collaboration and a speedy launch of EDIS proposals.  

6. Redesign policy towards neighboring countries

Security crises in Europe’s east and south cast a stark light on the shortcomings of the EU’s neighborhood policy and enlargement approach. A strategic redesign is necessary, with a focus on three areas: 

• Bespoke policy for strategically significant non-member neighbors.  
• Reforming EU enlargement policy with a dedicated European Commission Directorate-General for enlargement proper. 
• Utilizing the European Political Community: its 44 countries can advance EU goals by boosting candidate countries and enhancing cooperation with those that do not aspire to be EU members 

7. Mainstream External Action Plus

The EU’s external action has expanded to include internal policies — such as competition, climate and health — with external dimensions (External Action Plus). But the linkages between internal and external dimensions are often uncoordinated, which leads to overlap and incoherence. Mechanisms to mainstream climate, health and gender goals into external action, for instance, should be systematic and rigorous, with a single focal point tracking their reach.  

Indicators, data collection and impact assessments should track progress to ensure meaningful impact. In addition, agencies that focus primarily on intra-EU activities — such as the European Institute for Gender Equality — could be incorporated into the formulation and implementation of EU foreign policy to assist in mainstreaming efforts.  

8. Remodel strategic partnerships 

Rapidly evolving security challenges and a changing geopolitical landscape require a conceptional and functional review of the EU’s strategic partnerships based on its long-term foreign policy goals. Obsolete partnerships should be phased out, while strategic ones should be strengthened, and future partnerships identified. A flexible framework for these partnerships should allow them to respond to emerging developments and define crucial areas for collaboration. 

Within the redesigned partnerships, issue-based arrangements should be prioritized. These arrangements, based on clear shared objectives, can be implemented rapidly through detailed roadmaps, and verified regularly by the relevant Commission directorate-general or EEAS unit. 

9. Level the Global Gateway playing field 

The public-private Global Gateway strategically selects regions for infrastructure investment. Creating a level playing field for European companies in Global Gateway projects requires stringent environmental, social, governance, and due diligence standards. In public tenders, the price-quality ratio should be prioritized over the lowest cost, externalities over the lifecycle of a project should be priced in, and stricter nationality rules should be developed to address the companies that control participating entities. 

The EU’s novel International Procurement Instrument should be applied to all Global Gateway projects so EU firms can contribute to strategic global infrastructure, while excluding companies from third countries that do not allow EU firms to take part in their public procurement processes. 

10. Utilize the Team Europe format

In 2020, EU institutions, Member States, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) developed a Team Europe approach. These combined efforts provided short-term emergency finance during the pandemic, and the approach has continued to gain traction. 

By aligning international and national institutions to pursue common goals, Team Europe pools resources and delivers a unified message. This format should be further developed and adapted for use in crisis and non-crisis situations.  

Team Europe initiatives could also include non-EU financial bodies to reform multilateral development banks and prioritize climate objectives. Overall, Team Europe holds potential to increase the coherence of the EU’s external actions and create a sense of common ownership. 

The EU in the new international order

These recommendations are not without trade-offs, and the EU will undoubtedly need to apply strategic selectiveness in its international engagement. Yet adopting these recommendations would strengthen the EU’s foreign and security policy in important ways. If the collective mindset surpasses the defensive mode and unites towards progress, the EU can aim to shape the international order to allow it to thrive in an increasingly complex and confrontational global environment.