The Miraflores dilemma and the future of Venezuela

Venezuela is experiencing one of the most intense moments of social and geopolitical tension in its recent history, following a sudden escalation of the conflict with the United States. On January 3, US elite forces carried out Operation Absolute Resolution, during which they bombed several strategic locations across the country, including the capital, Caracas. The operation culminated in the capture of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro and his wife. Both are currently in custody and will be tried in New York on drug trafficking charges, while the Venezuelan government has denounced a “foreign aggression” and is demanding the restoration of its president.

Following the enigmatic press conference held by Donald Trump later that same day, numerous questions remain regarding Washington’s strategic plans and Venezuela’s future.

Context of the US intervention in Venezuela

Since September 2025, tensions between the United States and Venezuela have escalated steadily, though progressively. In recent months, the US Navy has illegally bombed up to 23 speedboats and one facility linked to drug trafficking on Venezuelan territory. At the same time, Washington has imposed an embargo on Venezuelan oil tankers and has deployed approximately 15,000 troops and around 15% of its naval fleet to the Caribbean Sea. This escalation culminated in the forced transfer of Maduro to the US on January 3.

Despite having won the presidency on an isolationist “America First” platform, Trump’s actions suggest a form of selective, geographically bounded isolationism. While he shows relative indifference toward Europe and Russia, he continues to view the American continent as the US backyard, reserving the right to intervene whenever he deems it necessary.

According to sources within the US Senate, the current strategy of removing Nicolás Maduro from the Miraflores Palace (the Venezuelan presidential palace) represents only the first link in a broader chain reaction. These sources argue that the fall of chavismo could trigger the collapse of the regimes in Nicaragua and Cuba. This potential domino effect, combined with the fight against drug trafficking and access to the world’s largest proven oil reserves—located in Venezuela—would constitute a major strategic victory for the Trump administration, particularly for its most interventionist wing, led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

The Miraflores dilemma

From the standpoint of international law, the US intervention is considered illegal, as it was carried out without authorization from the United Nations Security Council, the body responsible for approving military interventions in third countries. Even under US law, it remains unclear whether Trump could have conducted a foreign military operation without prior approval from the Senate.

Supporters of Nicolás Maduro emphasize this point to argue that his capture in Caracas constitutes a blatant violation of Venezuelan sovereignty and a repeated breach of international law. Likewise, Trump’s critics draw parallels with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, when the US intervened militarily in an energy-rich country with the declared objective of replacing an authoritarian regime with a liberal democracy.

On the other hand, opponents of the regime—such as Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado—argue that Maduro is no longer Venezuela’s legitimate leader and view the US intervention as a necessary action to restore democratic governance. According to them, in the Venezuelan presidential elections held on July 28, 2024, opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia won 73.25% of the vote, based on the electoral records presented by the opposition. The National Electoral Council (CNE) allegedly committed electoral fraud in Maduro’s favor by manipulating the vote count. To date, the CNE has failed to release the official tally sheets, which would demonstrate that Nicolás Maduro is unable to legitimize his presidency. Following this logic, the opposition argues that the US intervention does not constitute an illegal act of aggression, but rather a necessary step toward restoring Venezuela’s legitimate government in exile.

Both positions present strong arguments that are difficult to assess externally. The central question remains what political project Washington envisions for Venezuela and whom Trump intends to see governing from the Miraflores Palace.

Venezuela tomorrow

The White House press conference following Maduro’s capture raised more questions than answers. President Trump focused his remarks on the exploitation of Venezuelan oil and compensation for US companies, relegating human rights and the restoration of democracy to a secondary role. He also stated that the US would “administer” Venezuela temporarily and that his team—specifically referring to Marco Rubio—would negotiate directly with Venezuelan vice president Delcy Rodríguez.

Particularly striking were Trump’s comments about María Corina Machado, whom he described as a weak leader lacking domestic legitimacy, as well as his assertion that he does not rule out deploying US troops on Venezuelan soil to “stabilize” the country.

If the Trump administration opts for direct governance of Venezuela, it will face structural challenges of enormous complexity. Venezuela is a vast country (912,050 km²), with a population of approximately 31 million people, an oil industry deeply degraded by decades of mismanagement, and highly diverse geography.

Although Venezuela does not exhibit the ethnic or religious diversity of places such as Iraq, it is nonetheless home to numerous groups with sharply divergent interests. The chavista government has created a “hybrid state,” characterized by active cooperation between state institutions and criminal or paramilitary groups. This dynamic includes state tolerance of drug trafficking and illegal mining in exchange for rents, the infiltration of criminal actors into local governments, and the use of armed “colectivos” for urban political repression. However, this does not mean that Caracas fully controls organized crime (such as the Tren de Aragua), nor that the state intentionally directs narcotics toward the US, despite a certain degree of cooperation and synergy between the state apparatus and criminal groups.

In addition, Colombian socialist guerrilla groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and FARC dissidents maintain close ties with the Maduro regime. These organizations provide territorial and political control in exchange for access to illicit economies such as mining, smuggling, and drug trafficking, particularly in border regions. The ELN acts as the de facto authority in large areas of Apure, Zulia, Táchira, and Amazonas, and has even established a presence in urban centers. According to InSight Crime, some guerrilla leaders have expressed their willingness to resist a US intervention militarily.

Although the Venezuelan armed forces have proven incapable of confronting US operations, a potential ground intervention would force Washington to also confront deeply entrenched criminal and guerrilla networks, which are unlikely to abandon highly lucrative illicit businesses and would most likely resort to prolonged asymmetric resistance.

For now, Trump claims that Marco Rubio is negotiating with Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, and has threatened a second, more devastating attack if she fails to yield to the White House. Rodríguez, for her part, has adopted a defiant stance, demanding Maduro’s return to Caracas and insisting that Venezuela will not once again become “the colony of another empire.” At present, Trump appears to be betting on a partial surrender by the Maduro regime. This would entail accepting the call for new elections—though Trump has already stated that these will not take place in the short term—liberalizing the Venezuelan economy in favor of US interests, and compensating US companies for economic damages resulting from the nationalization of Venezuelan oil in the 2000s.

To forecast the possible outcomes of this crisis, it is useful to examine relevant historical precedents. The two most instructive cases for understanding Venezuela’s current situation are Panama 1989 and Afghanistan 1979.

Panama 1989

Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 represents the ideal outcome for Washington and the opposition.

During the 1980s, Panama was ruled by dictator Manuel Noriega. Although he had been trained by the CIA in his youth, his involvement in drug trafficking, among other factors, ultimately led to a rupture with the White House. When Noriega committed electoral fraud in May 1989, President George H. W. Bush decided to invade Panama with 26,000 US troops to overthrow the regime.

After just 42 days, the US military succeeded in capturing and imprisoning Noriega, and installed Guillermo Endara—the legitimate winner of the Panamanian elections—as president.

At first glance, the Maduro and Noriega regimes share several similarities. Despite the clear invasion of a sovereign country, both the majority of the international community and the Panamanian population have come to view the US intervention as positive. For the Venezuelan opposition, this case represents an ideal precedent: the invasion was swift, effective, and aimed at establishing a democratic regime.

Afghanistan 1979

A lesser-known case is Operation Storm-333, carried out by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1979. In 1978, a communist-inspired coup transformed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan into a Soviet satellite state under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Taraki. However, in September 1979, Taraki was overthrown and assassinated by Hafizullah Amin, a member of a rival communist faction, who quickly lost control of the country.

Facing the risk that its allied regime would collapse in the face of an anti-communist Islamist insurgency, Moscow decided to intervene militarily to replace Amin. On December 27, 1979, Soviet special forces launched a surprise assault on the Tajbeg Palace in Kabul and, in less than 40 minutes, killed Amin and installed Babrak Karmal, a leader more closely aligned with Kremlin interests. In the days that followed, the USSR occupied Afghanistan’s main cities with nearly 30,000 troops, under the pretext of securing the new government and “stabilizing” the country.

What makes this intervention distinctive is that it did not seek to overthrow an ideologically hostile regime, but rather to rescue an allied regime in the process of collapse. Afghanistan was already within the Soviet sphere of influence, but the Kremlin considered Amin incapable of governing and responsible for generating dangerous regional instability. Soviet logic assumed that replacing the leader would reinforce political control without the need for a prolonged occupation. This calculation proved erroneous: what was intended as a brief operation devolved into the long Soviet–Afghan War.

This precedent is particularly relevant to Venezuela. If Donald Trump opts to cooperate with chavismo under Delcy Rodríguez rather than promote a profound democratic transition, the capture of Nicolás Maduro may represent nothing more than a change in leadership, not in regime. As in Afghanistan, removing a problematic figure does not guarantee stability and may ultimately bind Washington to a structurally weak, corrupt, and dependent regime, with unpredictable medium- and long-term consequences.

Conclusions

The United States must act with extreme caution if it wishes to avoid repeating past mistakes. The coming days will be critical in determining Venezuela’s future. Whether Trump chooses to force regime change as in Panama, preserve the chavista regime as in Afghanistan, or negotiate a peaceful democratic transition, each option will carry consequences for years to come.

If an intervention similar to Panama 1989 were to be replicated, it is worth recalling that Venezuela is a country twelve times larger. A far larger US force would be required to occupy the country’s main centers and remove chavistas from power. Moreover, even if the US succeeds in persuading the local population to cooperate with a new government to rebuild the country, there currently exists a vast network of chavista forces, criminal groups, colectivos, and guerrillas loyal to chavismo. While they may be unable to confront a US intervention in urban areas, they control illicit businesses that are too profitable to simply relinquish their weapons to a transitional government.

Alternatively, a scenario similar to Afghanistan 1979 could unfold. With Maduro now imprisoned, interim president Delcy Rodríguez could be persuaded to pragmatically align herself with Washington. It bears emphasizing that the US operation captured only Maduro and his wife, leaving the entire chavista leadership intact. Based on recent statements by Trump and Marco Rubio regarding Rodríguez, it appears they are highly interested in cooperating with her to impose their influence over Venezuela. They will likely demand that she grant US companies the right to exploit Venezuela’s vast oil and mineral reserves—though this would require many years of investment and political stability to become profitable—in exchange for keeping the chavista government in the Miraflores Palace. The question is whether a post-Maduro dictatorial government, mired in corruption and ideologically conditioned against the US, could remain in power long-term under US tutelage.

Finally, it is also possible to negotiate a peaceful transition to democracy with the Maduro regime, similar to the transitions experienced in Spain and Chile. This would require the US to offer broad amnesty to members of the Caracas government. According to leaked details of the transition plan prepared by the Venezuelan opposition, they believe it would only be necessary to purge “a couple of dozen” Bolivarian Army officers and claim that the armed forces largely support a democratic transition. If Venezuela’s security apparatus comes to believe that its only options are resistance against Washington or prison, many may choose resistance—even in the form of jungle guerrillas. It remains unclear what conditions Trump is demanding of Delcy Rodríguez, but if they are too harsh, many actors may refuse to accept them.

By deciding to capture Nicolás Maduro, Donald Trump has set aside his America First policy and is reviving a new “Don-Roe Doctrine.” In attempting to resolve the Miraflores dilemma, he risks either repeating the mistakes of the past or becoming a liberator in the eyes of many. If he succeeds in restoring a stable democracy in Venezuela, he will be widely praised, as George H. W. Bush was in Panama; if, on the contrary, the conflict drags on for decades, he will be remembered as yet another imperial aggressor. As history shows, it tends to reward winners and punish losers, and public opinion will judge him based on the outcome of this crisis. Whoever governs in Caracas, residing in the Miraflores Palace will not be an easy task.