How moral philosophy can explain political polarization

Abortion is a deeply contested issue. Imagine two prolife people who both believe abortion is wrong standing before a ballot measure on whether it should be banned. One voter decides the procedure should remain legal in any case, believing that personal circumstances and individual choice matter too much for an outright prohibition. The other voter, convinced that the act is categorically wrong, supports a complete ban. The paradox is clear: people can share the same negative moral judgment of an act yet differ sharply in whether they believe it should be banned outright.

So why is this? Esade Assistant Professor Namrata Goyal and her students, Lorenzo De Gregori and Yuqi Liu (Esade), and Professor Krishna Savani (Hong Kong Polytechnic University), explored this question in a pioneering study. Their work is published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.

If it’s wrong, is it always wrong?

Goyal’s team conducted nine studies across nearly 30 years of data, drawing on digital language analysis, global surveys, and controlled experiments. They analyzed responses to hot-button topics such as abortion, marijuana, euthanasia, and gun ownership across Europe the United States, and dozens of other countries.

The results were clear: the philosophical stance on moral absolutism vs. relativism (rather than political ideology itself) is a main predictor of the support for bans on practices one deems as immoral.

Put bluntly, as one of the studies framed it, absolutists believe “if it’s wrong, it’s wrong everywhere,” while relativists take the view, “I don’t approve, but others can decide.” This difference was the same across countries and platforms, suggesting a robust psychological divide.

This might explain why conservatives tend to often favor blanket rulings of behaviors they consider as immoral, while liberals tend to avoid endorsing universal vetoes, despite disapproving a certain act. Indeed, the studies found that on average conservatives were more likely to lean toward moral absolutism, while liberals exhibited higher levels of moral relativism. Nevertheless, their philosophical stances were a stronger predictor of policies preferences than their political ideology. This means that an absolutist conservative and a liberal often had a similar stance towards bans compared to an absolutist vs. a relativist conservative. Ideology alone is not enough to determines one´s stance on bans.

Goyal conducted parallel studies to uncover why liberals and conservatives differ in their moral philosophies. Their research shows that moral absolutism is linked to a need for closure (NFC)—a psychological desire for certainty and unambiguous rules. People high in NFC dislike shades of grey, preferring black-and-white answers. The research team found that NFC statistically mediated the relationship between political ideology and moral relativism/absolutism. Therefore, bans are cognitively appealing to those high on need for closure and moral absolutism because they offer closure and eliminate ambiguity, thus putting pay to psychological discomfort.

These philosophical differences are not just abstract thought experiments. They present themselves as measurable differences in policy preferences, which in turn affect citizens’ daily lives and freedoms.

Real-life consequences

This matters because it helps explain why polarization over bans is so entrenched. Abortion, marijuana, euthanasia, and gun ownership are not only moral flashpoints but also examples of how absolutist versus relativist thinking shapes societies’ laws. According to a 2025 Gallup poll, among Americans against abortion, just 1 out of 3 prolife believe that abortion should be illegal in all cases, whereas remaining prolife people have more flexible views on abortion policies. This suggests that even when people view an action is wrong, they can differ drastically in policy positions. Goyal´s studies show that a person´s stance on moral relativism is the best predictor of one´s policy position.

Polarization could be reduced by promoting awareness of relativism

Each philosophical stance has its strengths and weaknesses: while moral absolutism can provide clarity, consistency, and a strong sense of conviction, moral relativism allows for openness, empathy, and flexibility. One-size-fits-all laws, often deriving from absolutist thinking, can have life-changing consequences. Rigid rules, lacking nuance, risk inflicting undue harm. Yet the opposite problem also exists: lax laws that fail to enforce consequences for immoral or unlawful behavior may also have damaging effects. This is why further investigations regarding the contexts in which each philosophical stance is collectively more beneficial are needed.

Crucially, the paper also investigated whether exposure to relativism could shift people’s views. Indeed, there was an effect. Participants exposed to relativist framings expressed less support for bans on abortion, marijuana, same-sex marriage, and even the death penalty. As the authors write: “Liberals and conservatives exposed to moral relativism reduced their support for banning practices that they opposed.” This suggests that promoting awareness of relativism—helping people understand that situations and beliefs can vary depending on context—may reduce polarization by encouraging more open-minded and flexible thinking.

Rethinking political conflict

What emerges from this research is not simply that liberals and conservatives value different things, but that they often operate with different moral philosophies. Two people with opposite political ideologies may agree that an act is immoral, but they differ on whether they feel that politics should dictate whether or not that act is permitted under law.

Understanding the context and its complexity may be a key to decreasing the support for bans

Conservatives tend to interpret moral judgments as universal imperatives, which could lead them to support banning policies more often. On the other hand, liberals tend to see moral judgments as more context-dependent, and therefore to oppose blanket bans.

This divergence matters in political dialogue. If polarization is rooted not only in opposing values but also in opposing philosophies of morality, then bridging divides cannot be achieved by arguing issue by issue. Especially in cases where both parties agree that an act is morally wrong. When compromise seems out of reach, both sides need to recognize that some people might seek universal rules, while others might focus on contextual nuance and individual agency.

Goyal’s studies show that even small nudges toward relativism and understanding context can reduce support for bans, regardless of the political ideology. This offers hope that polarization is not fixed. If leaders, educators, and the media take responsibility to present moral debates in ways that highlight complexity and context, they may create space for compromise that rigid moral absolutism tends to shut down.