The crossroads of the liberal international order

It is assumed that the interaction of a society's various components can contribute to establishing a social order that fosters stability. These components may include the social structure, institutions, social relations, interactions, social behavior, and cultural characteristics. Social order thus emerges when individuals agree on a shared social contract that sets certain rules and laws, which must be upheld to maintain standards, values, and norms that contribute to the stability of that order. In fact, social order, through these norms and laws, provides behavioral patterns that allow for the realization of values essential to social life (Bull, 1977). 

This does not mean that all behavioral patterns contribute to such an order—only those that protect the values essential to maintaining a stable social life (Tadashi, 2021). With that in mind, let me offer some reflections on the liberal international order, which has been a Western-based order theorized by Deudney and Ikenberry (1999) and, according to the latter, has dominated the world over the last 70 years (Ikenberry, 2018). 

The goals and principles of the liberal international order

To begin, the first question we must ask is: what should we understand by a liberal international order? At its core, this order can be seen as the result of establishing an international framework grounded in liberal values such as individual freedom in the economic sphere, separation of powers, and equality before the law. Indeed, it is the product of two projects developed during the formation of modern Western societies. On the one hand, the modern state system that originated with the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which upheld the principle of the inviolable sovereignty of nation-states as independent and sovereign actors; on the other, an Anglo-American order that emerged between the 19th and 20th centuries, whose guiding political principles were economic openness, security cooperation, and the creation of multilateral institutions (Ikenberry, 2011, and others). 

The liberal order has been defined by its pursuit of economic stability, cooperation, and the idea of a ‘free world’

The intention of this project was to give it an internationalist character: through the creation of agreements and institutions such as the Bretton Woods Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, among others, the United States and its Western allies have sought to promote it worldwide. At the same time, this order has aimed to maintain international economic stability, foster cooperation, and defend the idea of a "free world." The objective has been to consolidate a liberal project that would also generate material progress through economic globalization, which, particularly since the 1980s, has been underpinned by neoliberal ideology. We must not forget that one of the goals of modern societies is to promote progress to achieve the material well-being of their citizens. 

Moreover, the major Western powers, led by the United States, have tried to influence most countries and regions around the world, expecting the liberal international order to become dominant after the Cold War. As Ikenberry (2018) noted, there were reasons to believe that the course of history was moving in a more internationalist, progressive, and liberal direction following the end of that period. However, that order has not been successfully consolidated. In fact, some experts argue that it is unclear to what extent the order is truly open or what its rules are (Kundnani, 2017). It is also unclear whether we are talking about political liberalism, economic liberalism, or perhaps the use and framing of the term by international relations theorists to differentiate themselves from other schools, such as political realism, which focuses on national interest, security, and power (Kundnani, 2017). Therefore, the term carries a certain complexity and ambiguity. 

Explaining factors behind the crisis of the liberal order

Currently, a dominant narrative is emerging that emphasizes the crisis of the liberal international order (Williams, 2025). This leads us to ask: what factors are reinforcing this narrative? 

First, we must emphasize that an international order fundamentally depends on the distribution of power (Mearsheimer, 2019). Accordingly, any order needs a hegemonic power to promote it. This has been the case for the liberal international order, promoted under the hegemonic leadership of the United States, following its ideological victory over the USSR. As a result, the US emerged as the hegemonic leader not only promoting but also attempting to consolidate this order on a global scale. However, this order has failed to achieve its goal because it has only developed in the West and, consequently, remains limited (Mearsheimer, 2019). There is little evidence that liberalism has been widely accepted globally; we can find governments grounded in religious principles (e.g., Iran), autocratic states (e.g., China or Russia), and, of course, conservative regimes (Mearsheimer, 2019). 

We are thus witnessing a new distribution of power in which the United States and its Western allies have clearly seen a decline in their power and influence. They are finding it increasingly difficult to impose their agenda and worldview. A clear example is the sanctions imposed on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, as not all developing countries are supporting them. However, it is not entirely accurate to claim we are now in an order characterized by multilateralism (Ikenberry, 2018). In fact, there is no consensus among experts on whether a multilateral order—based on institutions and states working together toward common goals—should be considered an irreversible or essential process of the international system. I would argue we are witnessing an order undergoing the formation of power poles that are not yet consolidated and are, on the contrary, in constant flux. 

The recognition of equality among nation-states has not been reflected in the liberal international order

A second noteworthy aspect is the following. As previously mentioned, the Westphalian system of 1648 laid the structural foundation of the international order by attempting to recognize the equality of its members. However, this recognition of equality among nation-states has not been reflected in the liberal international order, as there is a clear stratification of power among them. It is evident that this project has been led by the United States and, to a lesser extent, its Western allies. Yet, the countries that have joined or challenged this order—either partially or fully—have not only questioned US hegemony, but have also argued that their voices and interests deserve to be heard. 

A third relevant aspect is that the liberal international order, its institutions, and principles are facing a strong threat from illiberal powers on the global stage (Ikenberry, 2018; Williams, 2025). It is clear that rising revisionist or authoritarian powers, such as China and Russia, disagree with the way Western powers have sought to shape this order based on neoliberal ideology and promote it globally since the end of the Cold War. As Kundnani (2017) notes, Russia wishes to return to the order established at the Yalta Conference (1945), where states with different ideologies and political systems coexisted. In contrast, China believes that the state, as a sovereign entity, should play a central role as the economic and political regulator of each country, with each state determining its own form of government. While China recognizes and accepts the importance of economic globalization, it believes that the state must ensure its proper functioning and stability. This explains why revisionist powers are forming alliances to change the global balance of power—they do not seem to agree that the United States should remain the hegemonic power or that the order it promoted should continue to prevail internationally. 

The international order will only become more stable and legitimate if it gives developing countries a voice to foster stronger governance

As for national populisms, they can be seen as a symptom of the crisis of the liberal international order. In fact, populism in the United States and most Western countries has become an asymmetric counter-concept to democracy (Houwen, 2011). Populist rhetoric seeks a supposed or false refounding of democracy around the unity between the leader and the people, based on the discrediting of traditional political elites. As a result, there is an antagonistic relationship between the political elite and the people, who try to express their interests through politics. This explains why populist movements or parties use populism as a political strategy, with the populist or personalist leader governing with the support of followers (Weyland, 2017). We can see this in Western Europe, where populist or far-right parties are proliferating despite the predominance of liberal or neoliberal ideology. 

One factor that may explain the rise of these movements or parties is the widespread distrust of government institutions. According to the ICIP-Esade EcPol survey Polarization and coexistence in Spain 2021, distrust of Spain’s main institutions is notable (Garmendia, Amuitz and León Sandra, 2022). Similarly, the 2021 Latinobarómetro revealed that trust in Latin American governments fell from 46% in 2010 to 27% in 2020, while trust in political parties dropped from 24% in 2013 to 13% in the last year. This may be because citizens perceive ruling elites as elitist in nature and indifferent to their social needs and interests. Moreover, the inequality generated by economic globalization—driven by neoliberal ideology—has left many workers in Western countries, especially in the United States, frustrated with their precarious working conditions. These elements converge to boost the political influence of far-right and populist parties in the West, as portions of the population increasingly turn to these parties in the hope they will address their concerns and improve their lives. 

A fourth factor worth highlighting is the rise of Donald Trump to power in the United States, as the former president displayed hostility toward the liberal order. With his slogan "Make America Great Again" and the policies he implemented in trade and immigration, he demonstrated an anti-globalist, nationalist, populist, and ultimately illiberal stance. For example, his proposal to increase tariffs—and in some cases actually doing so—has affected many of the country's trading partners and Western allies. For Trump, defending American interests requires limiting and reversing the integration process of economic globalization, underpinned by neoliberal ideology, especially because he believes that some countries have benefited from it at the expense of the United States. He insists that the US has been harmed by this process, as evidenced by significant trade deficits with several countries, including China. Furthermore, he considers it crucial for American multinational companies to return to the US to help create jobs and ensure that their profits are reinvested domestically. This is just one indication that he is unwilling to continue supporting the liberal international order that the US once promoted, because he believes it harms the country. 

The crisis of liberal democracies

While the factors mentioned above help explain the narrative surrounding the crisis of the liberal order, it is important to highlight that this crisis has also triggered a crisis in liberal democracies. This can be attributed to economic inequality and the widespread loss of trust in public institutions’ ability to meet citizens’ needs, as previously mentioned. But that is not all: party systems are evolving with the emergence of populist and radical parties, which have increased their presence in Europe. At the very least, the retreat of liberal democracies is evident in Western Europe. Cases such as Hungary and Poland clearly illustrate this trend, as does the growing influence of the far right in countries like France. 

Democracy is undergoing a process of deconsolidation characterized by growing voter indifference

One explanatory factor that accompanies the rise of these populist parties is affective polarization. This fosters the alignment of partisan identities with other social identities, such as racial or territorial ones, and heightens the perception of ideological distance between political parties (Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Webster and Abramowitz, 2017; West and Iyengar, 2022). Comparative and experimental studies show a relationship between ideological and affective polarization: as political parties grow more ideologically distant from one another, voters also drift apart and become more willing to express hostility toward those they consider ideological opponents (Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Webster and Abramowitz, 2017). This helps explain the emergence of populist parties, whose political agendas often lie at opposite extremes of the ideological spectrum, thereby exacerbating divisions within society and undermining liberal democracy. This fragmentation hinders deliberative processes needed to reach broadly accepted solutions. Hence, democracy appears to be undergoing a process of deconsolidation marked by increasing voter indifference and, consequently, a partial failure of liberal democracy (Kundnani, 2020). 

Therefore, if social order is essential for a stable social life, we must recognize that the social actors involved—in this case, nation-states—must safeguard its preservation. This means not only ensuring the legitimacy of the participants, but also providing material benefits so that the order can endure. In this sense, we can say that there are groups or parties within Western powers that no longer support maintaining the liberal order because traditional parties have failed to improve the material conditions of their societies, which face increasing economic inequality and job insecurity. In addition, the decline in Western influence and coercive power is making it harder to uphold the liberal order over time. 

Indeed, we can assume that contradictions within liberal societies and the nation-state itself are paving the way for authoritarian leaders and, consequently, eroding the legitimacy of the liberal international order. This brings us to the final question: how deep is the crisis of this order? I believe it is not only a crisis of US hegemonic leadership, but a broader crisis of an order that increasingly fails to inspire enthusiasm in other parts of the world. In fact, it is leading to growing disillusionment with the liberal international order, which stems from its inability to convince citizens that it can provide the well-being they demand. Moreover, it is contributing to a reconfiguration of power marked by weak governance coalitions and institutions. 

Finally, I believe this order will only become more stable and legitimate if it gives voice to developing countries in order to build stronger governance. At the same time, it must promote economic development that meets social needs and helps build robust institutions—both locally and globally—where civil society actively participates in political decision-making on pressing issues like climate change. This would not only ensure a more democratic and socially legitimate decision-making process, but also greater social acceptance, as the order would be centered on social well-being. If Western powers, especially the United States, want to preserve the liberal international order, they must take these factors into account.